4 March 2013
Contact:
Stephen M. Apatow
Founder,
Director of Research & Development
Humanitarian
Resource Institute (UN:NGO:DESA)
Humanitarian University
Consortium Graduate Studies
Center
for Medicine, Veterinary Medicine & Law
Phone:
203-668-0282
Email:
s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net
Internet:
www.humanitarian.net
H-II
OPSEC
Url:
www.H-II.org
The Anatomy of Counterinsurgency Warfare
In the Global War on Terrorism, the unique nature
of insurgency warfare is still unfamiliar to a large cross-section of
politicians, journalists, civil servants, public opinion makers and
military personnel. Syria provides the world an unfortunate opportunity
to watch a complex emergency with destabilization of a Failed State, in
a prolonged conflict (23 months, costing 100,000 lives), with
insurgency exploitation from day one. The following paper may help shed
some important light on this subject:
"The
economic means of power are difficult to use in insurgency warfare
because of the presence of insurgents among the civilian population.
Sanctions will hit civilians to a larger degree than the insurgents,
since the insurgents can optimise their own situation by the use of
weapons and thereby worsen civilian suffering. On the other hand,
insurgency warfare is basically about obtaining the favour of the
civilian population, so economic support will often be a very powerful
tool – but only if this support is provided as early as possible in the
conflict. This means that the counterinsurgents can not wait until the
armoured conflict has been won. The counterinsurgents must act
proactively as soon as thesecurity situation allows. The longer they
wait, the more difficult it will be for the military to maintain the
necessary security. As a consequence, there is a far greater risk to
the civilian population, and to those civilians who deliver economic
and civilian relief." -- The Anatomy of Counterinsurgency Warfare, Royal Danish Defence
College.
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